Lords Reform
The British constitution is a mess, and it always has been. Unlike the clearly laid out articles, clauses and amendments of the Constitution of the United States, Britain has blundered its way forward (not always unsuccessfully) with a partly written, partly unwritten statute for centuries. Various governments have tried to untangle the knotted threads of our system over the years, but they have always been foiled by the sheer complexity of our overlapping, intertwining and faintly archaic charter.
At the centre of this logjam lies the House of Lords. The Lords has a long and colorful history of opposing the will of the democratically elected Commons. Time and again, they have essentially spat in the face of the public by rejecting legislation put forward by our elected representatives. Understandably furious MP’s have, over time, castrated the Lords and forced it into compliance with the Lower Chamber. They have never abolished it, however, accepting that a Second chamber is necessary to act as some sort of constitutional check on the government and Parliament.
When Labour came into power in 1997 a key part of its manifesto was House of Lords reform. Its wish for a democratic and accountable Upper house was stymied, however, and instead of a democratic house we got a hodgepodge of hereditary and appointed peers. In effect, a bunch of Aristocrats and unelected Party political cronies had a major say in how we were governed. Distracted by more pressing concerns (Iraq, Tuition Fees), the government decided to postpone meaningful reform until the next parliament.
Constitutional reform is not the most trendy or eye-catching issue in modern politics; most voters couldn’t give a damn about the make-up of the Lords or the division of powers between Commons and Lords. Governing is never a trendy occupation, however, and for every eye-catching initiative there are ten nuts-and-bolts issues politicians have to slog through.
Last week, there was a major vote on Lords reform, one of the most significant in history. A 113 strong majority of MP’s voted for a fully elected Upper Chamber. Bear in mind, however, that this was only a recommendation; the government could choose to ignore the express wishes of the Commons and make the Lords entirely appointed, if it so wished.
The Lords, of course, ignored the Commons vote and instead plumped for an entirely appointed body. They did this out of more than the old aristocratic contempt for the elected branch of the legislature, however; there are several arguments in favor of an appointed house which deserve a fair hearing. Firstly, appointed Lords are not beholden to their Party in the same way elected representatives are. They need not fear the lash of the Whips and so have a lot more intellectual independence. Secondly, appointed peers can be chosen to deliberately represent a plethora of professions, population groups and minorities – a far cry from the predominantly white, male, upper middle class Commons. Thirdly, there is no risk of an appointed Lords challenging the Commons in any serious way. Appointees have no democratic legitimacy and it is absurd to imagine them taking on the democratically elected Commons. Finally, given the contempt in which politicians are held in Britain, why would the public want to elect another bunch of politicians, who are so widely perceived as careerist and selfish?
One problem remains however, and it is a fundamental and intractable one. The Lords plays a not insignificant role in governing over us, so it should be democratically accountable. We should have the right to chuck out the people who make our laws if we think they are doing a bad job. There is no getting around this fact; democracies elect their legislatures.
Do we really want two equally powerful legislative bodies, though? This would lead to ineffective government which cannot get anything done – like in the US. The Senate and House of Representatives are each so powerful that it is hard for government to effect changes. Part of the reason why an obscene 40 million Americans have no health insurance is that, even if a government is elected with a mandate to give the people healthcare, its legislation gets lost in the traffic jam of the Houses. Consensus is very difficult to reach and the people without healthcare suffer as a result.
Along with democratizing the Lords then, reform must make clear that the Upper House is to have a different role to the Lower; revising rather than initiating legislation, cross-examining rather than containing ministers in its membership, postponing but never vetoing the passage of bills. It is possible to have both a fairly elected Lords which does not clash with the Commons, leading to legislative gridlock; and a Lords which has teeth sharp enough to let the government know when it is making a mistake.
-posted by Adam
